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First Amendment Concerns in Governmental Acquisition 
and Analysis of Mobile Device Location Data 
Gerald J. Votava III∗ 
I would rather be exposed to the inconveniences 
attending too much liberty, than those attending too 
small a degree of it. 
Thomas Jefferson1 
INTRODUCTION 
Mobile cellular telephones have been widely adopted in the United States, and 
they are essentially a ubiquitous item carried by all citizens, similar to a person’s 
house keys and wallet.2 These mobile devices are in near constant communication 
with nearby cellular radio towers and related infrastructure and are required by 
Federal Regulations to include location-identifying technology for the use of 9-1-1 
services.3 These systems, while providing clear benefits to the public, also provide 
governmental authorities an unprecedented ability to identify, monitor, collect, and 
analyze the location and movements of all people within the range of a cellular 
radio tower.4 
Over the past generation, the United States has shifted to a form of 
governance dependent on the collection, collation, and analysis of information 
about its people.5 These information gathering activities are intended to enhance 
                                                          
∗ Gerald J. Votava III is a J.D. Candidate at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2014; 
B.E.E. in Electrical Engineering from the Villanova University. 
1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Archibald Stuart in Philadelphia (Dec. 23, 1791), in 22 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 436 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1986). 
2 See infra Part I.A and associated footnotes. 
3 See infra Part I.B and associated footnotes. 
4 See infra Part I.C and associated footnotes. 
5 Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 
2020, at 198 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009). 
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national security, prevent crime, and deliver social services.6 This new form of 
governance is the National Surveillance State.7 
This pervasive and unchecked surveillance threatens Americans’ rights of 
freedom of expression and freedom of association.8 Datasets of the locations and 
movements of individuals obtained via mobile device location data9 can be 
combined to elicit patterns of association.10 Writing in concurrence in the landmark 
GPS case, United States v. Jones,11 Justice Sotomayor said, “[a]wareness that the 
Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. And 
the Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects 
of identity is susceptible to abuse.”12 
I. MOBILE DEVICE LOCATION DATA: ORIGINS AND USES 
A. Current Technology 
Mobile cellular devices are now very prevalent in the United States, and are 
carried by most citizens every day. These devices include traditional cellular 
telephones known as feature phones, advanced cellular telephones known as 
smartphones, and tablet and notebook computers with cellular radios included in 
the device. As of 2012, there were approximately 259 million people over the age 
of 14 in the United States.13 Telecommunications industry analyst data indicates 
that approximately 235 million people in that population utilize a mobile device,14 
equating to a penetration rate of over 90%. The data further indicates that roughly 
half of mobile device users have adopted advanced smartphones, including Apple 
                                                          
6 Id. at 199. 
7 Id. at 198. 
8 See infra Part II.A and associated footnotes. 
9 This article addresses mobile device location data as opposed to cell-site location records 
(CSLR), because CSLR is one component of location data, which also includes other services such as 
GPS and aGPS data created by mobile devices. 
10 See infra Part I.C and associated footnotes. 
11 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
12 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
13 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/us.html. 
14 Henry Blodget, Actually, The US Smartphone Revolution Has Entered The Late Innings, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/us-smartphone-market-2012-
9#ixzz2Mjqum3PI (citing ComScore data of mobile device usage). 
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3 
iPhone and Google Android devices.15 All mobile devices, including feature 
phones and smartphones, are capable of creating and transmitting various forms of 
data to identify the location of the device. 
1. Cell-site Location Records 
All cellular mobile devices connect to a telecommunications network via 
cellular radio towers constructed by private service providers.16 These towers 
contain up to three antennae, and keep records of the mobile devices that connect to 
them, including the specific sector that they are connecting from.17 These records 
are often referred to as cell-site location records (CSLR). The accuracy is limited to 
the distance between the recording cell radio tower and any nearby towers to which 
the mobile device can connect.18 Although this data is fairly general, it can be used 
to track a person’s movement. In addition to the passive collection of CSLR data, 
that data can be aggregated and analyzed to triangulate the user’s position.  
2. Global Positioning Systems 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) uses a network of 27 satellites to 
permit client devices to triangulate their position with a relatively high degree of 
accuracy.19 Devices with a greater number of GPS sensors or higher quality sensors 
are able to obtain better accuracy, but these devices are more expensive and require 
more power to operate.20 In mobile devices, traditional GPS systems have been 
augmented by assisted-GPS (aGPS).21 With aGPS, the mobile device continues to 
receive signals from GPS satellites, but it can also contact ground-based servers via 
a terrestrial telecommunication network, providing an even greater accuracy of the 
location data.22 The aGPS service reduces the time needed to acquire a location 
data point and assists with accuracy indoors, where signals from GPS satellites are 
more difficult to obtain.23 aGPS has many benefits for mobile device users. 
                                                          
15 Id. 
16 Cell Phone Location Tracking by Government: How It’s Done, GRITS FOR BREAKFAST (Mar. 4, 
2013), http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2013/03/cell-phone-location-tracking-by.html. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 S. Kamakshi, What is A-GPS? How Does it Work?, TECH2 (Mar. 18, 2010), http://tech2 
.in.com/features/all/what-is-agps-how-does-it-work/115142. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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4 
However by definition, the device also contacts third party networks, which can 
record locational data.24 
B. Services That Utilize Mobile Device Location Data 
There are numerous systems within a mobile device, which utilize mobile 
device location data. Often, these services are difficult or prohibited from disabling. 
As a result, whenever a user powers on their device, locational data is being 
recorded, and in some cases, shared with third parties. 
1. E911 Systems 
As cellular phones became the communication tool of choice for many 
Americans, they began to use those devices to initiate 9-1-1 emergency response 
calls. Traditionally, wireline telephone service provided 9-1-1 operators with 
specific location data in the case that the caller was unable or unwilling to provide 
that information. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) created 
regulations that compel mobile devices and the networks to which they connect, to 
provide data regarding the location of the device in order to assist in emergency 
response operations.25 Notably, by January 18, 2013, 67% of all calls placed from 
handsets should be locatable to within 50 meters,26 with further increases in 
accuracy required after that date. Compliance with these regulations is typically 
accomplished through the inclusion of GPS or aGPS technology within the mobile 
device, leaving consumers with no methods to opt out of this service. 
2. Use by Cellular Telecommunications Companies 
Telecommunications companies actively collect and utilize mobile location 
data.27 The data is utilized in a variety of ways. It can be used to understand how 
each company’s customers use the provided services so that the company can then 
take any necessary actions to strengthen and improve those services.28 Furthermore, 
mobile device location data is aggregated and used for marketing and advertising 
activities.29 
                                                          
24 Id. 
25 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2012); 911 Wireless Services, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/guides/wireless-
911-services (last visited Apr. 11, 2013). 
26 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(2)(i) (2012). 
27 Noam Cohen, It’s Tracking Your Every Move and You May Not Even Know, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 26, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/business/media/26privacy.html. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
  
 
 
A N A L Y S I S  O F  M O B I L E  D E V I C E  L O C A T I O N  D A T A  
Volume XIII – Spring 2013 ● ISSN 1087-6995 (print) 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2013.121 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
3. Use by Third Party Application Developers 
Modern mobile devices are often layered with an ecosystem of software 
applications created by third parties other than the device manufacturer or the 
telecommunications company. These applications expand the utility of the mobile 
device by allowing users to customize the features of the phone. Many of these 
applications acquire mobile device location data, and at times, transmit that data to 
third party servers to deliver additional service.30 
For example, some companies31 use mobile device location data to interpret, 
via algorithm, traffic flow in order to reroute other users of the application to their 
destination more efficiently.32 A second example involves a task as common as an 
internet search made from a mobile device. In an effort to improve its services and 
increase the value of user data used in connection with its advertising activities, 
Google, an internet search company,33 routinely gathers location data from users 
interacting with its search products.34 These locational details are retained as 
business records in connection with the company’s advertising businesses.35 
Finally, even mobile applications designed to connect us with our elected officials 
sometimes collect mobile device location data.36 
C. Obtainment of Location Data by Government Agents 
In the wake of Jones, government agents have increasingly used mobile 
device location data to identify the locations of investigation targets, and this has 
created a shift in governmental policy towards the warrantless acquisition of cell 
                                                          
30 Your Apps Are Watching You, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704694004576020083703574602.html; What They Know—Mobile, WALL ST. J., 
http://blogs.wsj.com/wtk-mobile/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2013). 
31 See WAZE, http://www.waze.com/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2013) (Waze is a mapping and traffic 
application that relies on location received from users to provide traffic estimates to other users of the 
application.). 
32 Saurabh Amin et al., Using GPS Mobile Phones As Traffic Sensors: A Field Experiment, 15TH 
WORLD CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS (Nov. 16, 2008), available at 
http://bayen.eecs.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/conferences/its08.pdf. 
33 See About Google, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/about/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2013) 
(corporate website). 
34 Jeremy Hull, What Else Are You Telling Google When You Hit the Search Button?, CLICKZ 
(Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.clickz.com/clickz/column/2254624/what-else-are-you-telling-google-
when-you-hit-the-search-button. 
35 Id. 
36 John E. Dunn, Obama and Romney election apps suck up personal data, research finds, 
NETWORKWORLD (Aug. 12, 2012), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2012/082112-obama-and-
romney-election-apps-261806.html. 
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6 
phone data.37 The data is often sought as a “business record,” belonging to cellular 
telecommunications companies or third party application developers, such as 
Google and Microsoft.38 
Elected leaders have also attempted to shed light on this issue. Rep. Edward 
Markley39 found that “in 2011, federal, state and local law enforcement agencies 
made more than 1.3 million requests of wireless carriers for the cell phone records 
of consumers.”40 The investigation further revealed that agencies often requested 
“‘cell tower dumps’ in which carriers provide all the phones numbers of cell users 
that connect with a tower during a discreet period of time, including information on 
innocent people.”41 
Advocacy groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), have 
also investigated the collection and use of mobile device location data. Their 
review of over 250 law enforcement agencies revealed that only 13 had not used 
mobile device location data.42 The investigation noted that some agencies 
pervasively seek and use the data.43 
Further, some government agents have begun to use the StingRay platform, 
which acts as a cellular radio tower in order to stimulate nearby mobile devices to 
identify their locations through triangulation.44 With this device, “government 
investigators and private individuals can locate, interfere with, and even intercept 
communications from cell phones and other wireless devices.”45 This activity 
                                                          
37 David Kravets, After Car-Tracking Smackdown, WIRED (Mar. 31, 2012), http://www 
.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/feds-move-to-cell-site-data/. 
38 Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/ 
userdatarequests/US/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2013); Brad Smith, Microsoft Releases 2012 Law 
Enforcement Requests Report, THE OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (Mar. 21, 2013), http://blogs 
.technet.com/b/microsoft_blog/archive/2013/03/21/microsoft-releases-2012-law-enforcement-requests-
report.aspx. 
39 Democratic Representative from Massachusetts. 
40 Markey: Law Enforcement Collecting Information on Millions of Americans from Mobile 
Phone Carriers, ED MARKEY (July 9, 2012), http://markey.house.gov/press-release/markey-law-
enforcement-collecting-information-millions-americans-mobile-phone-carriers. 
41 Id. 
42 Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records Request, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
(Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/protecting-civil-liberties-digital-age/cell-phone-location-tracking-
public-records-request. 
43 Id. 
44 EPIC v. FBI—Stingray/Cell Site Simulator, EPIC, http://epic.org/foia/fbi/stingray/ (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2013). 
45 Id. 
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7 
clearly goes beyond the seemingly innocuous practice of accessing business 
records. 
Finally, a significant concern with the sweeping collection of locational data 
is the government’s ability to analyze that information to determine an individual’s 
membership in groups.46 Algorithms can be used to determine individuals’ ad-hoc 
and semi-permanent social groups based on the examination of locational trends of 
groups of individuals.47 If government agents embrace this type of activity, it 
would very likely be considered an unconstitutional violation of the individual’s 
freedom of expressive association.48 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION 
A. Freedoms Defined 
The First Amendment,49 and its protection of speech, religion, expression, and 
association, is one of the critical cornerstones of American culture and democracy. 
There are four central principles behind these freedoms. First, open discussion has 
been recognized as an essential component of self-governance. The ability to 
directly criticize government officers and policies is within “the central meaning of 
the First Amendment.”50 Second, truth can be discovered through the clash of 
ideas. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes described this tension as a “marketplace of 
ideas,” each competing through the power of thought.51 Third, the First 
Amendment protects and fosters individuality and personal autonomy, and sees 
expression as intrinsically important. “The First Amendment serves not only the 
needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-
expression.”52 Finally, the three prior principles can be combined with a fourth 
principle of promoting tolerance. This principle “involves a special act of carving 
out one area of social interaction for extraordinary self-restraint, the purpose of 
                                                          
46 Steve Mardenfeld et al., GDC: Group Discovery using Co-location Traces, IEEE 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVACY, SECURITY, RISK AND TRUST (2010), available at http://cs 
.njit.edu/~borcea/papers/sca-socialcom10.pdf. 
47 Id. 
48 See infra Part II.A.1 and associated footnotes. 
49 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
50 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964). 
51 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
52 Procuiner v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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8 
which is to develop and demonstrate a social capacity to control feelings evoked by 
a host of social encounters.”53 
1. Freedom of Association 
The freedom of association is a constitutional right that ensures the 
inviolability and integrity of groups against unjustified government intrusion. The 
right is not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, but it has repeatedly been 
upheld as a right protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court first 
articulated the right in NAACP v. Alabama54 as the right to privacy in one’s 
associations. The Court held that the NAACP could not be required to disclose the 
identities of its members to state agents. 
The Court in NAACP defined association as foundational to First Amendment 
rights: 
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of 
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably 
enhanced by group association, as this Court has more 
than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus 
between the freedoms of speech and assembly. It is 
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for 
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable 
part of the . . . freedom of speech.55 
The Court also emphasized the need for privacy in association: 
It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure 
of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may 
constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of 
association as [affirmative governmental action in other 
cases.] This court has recognized the vital relationship 
between freedom of association and freedom of 
privacy.56 
                                                          
53 LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN 
AMERICA 9–10 (1986). 
54 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
55 Id. at 460. 
56 Id. at 462. 
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9 
Revelation of identity or association with a group “may induce members to 
withdraw . . . and dissuade others from joining [a group] because of fear of 
exposure of their beliefs . . . and of the consequences of this exposure.”57 These 
consequences are particularly pronounced when certain groups embrace beliefs that 
are not popular with the majority.58 The government’s conduct is “subject to the 
closest scrutiny” due to the seriousness of the harm.59 
In this case, NAACP members sought to prevent future releases of 
membership information because their members had previously been subjected to 
economic reprisals and physical threats from private individuals when their 
identities were divulged.60 The government claimed a need for the list in order to 
determine whether the organization was conducting intrastate business in violation 
of the Alabama Foreign Corporation Act.61 In evaluating the link between the 
statute and the list, the Court held such justification too insubstantial to require 
disclosure.62 
The Court has bifurcated the right of association into two broad categories:63 
intimate association64—the right to associate to pursue private relationships, and 
expressive association65—the right to associate to engage in protected First 
Amendment expression. 
2. Chilling Effects 
There is a strong possibility that overreaching relational surveillance will chill 
free expression and association. The First Amendment’s protection of freedom of 
association provides a proper framework for regulating relational surveillance.66 
Citizens are discouraged from exercising their constitutionally protected rights 
                                                          
57 Id. at 463. 
58 Id. at 462. 
59 Id. at 461. 
60 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462. 
61 Id. at 451. 
62 Id. at 464. 
63 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
64 Id. at 619–20. 
65 Id. at 618. 
66 Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment 
Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741 (2008). 
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10 
while under broad sweeping state inquiries.67 Even when the chilling effect is an 
unintended consequence of the government’s conduct, strict scrutiny review of the 
conduct is necessary.68 
In Clark v. Library of Congress,69 a government employee brought an action 
against his employer for conducting full-fledged investigations into his political 
activities with the Young Socialists Alliance.70 The court found that the 
investigation chilled the plaintiff’s right to freely associate,71 and found that there 
was no legitimate or compelling justification for the investigations.72 
Zweibon v. Mitchell73 discussed the problem of continuous surveillance by 
government agents. In this case, the Federal Bureau of Investigation subjected the 
Jewish Defense League to numerous wiretaps on their telephones without prior 
judicial approval.74 The court determined that a warrant was necessary for such 
surveillance.75 According to the court, judicial review was necessary to protect 
First Amendment rights of expression and association from the chilling effects of 
unsupervised and unlimited executive power to institute electronic surveillance.76 
3. Overbreadth 
A law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it regulates substantially more 
expression than the Constitution allows to be regulated.77 A law is deemed to be 
unconstitutionally overbroad when a person to whom the law can be 
constitutionally applied can argue that it would be unconstitutional as applied to 
others.78 Where the overbreadth is substantial and real, it is unconstitutional.79 The 
                                                          
67 Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971) (holding the State Bar Association’s bar of an 
applicant solely for membership in certain political organizations was barred by the First Amendment). 
68 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976). 
69 Clark v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
70 Id. at 91–92. 
71 Id. at 91. 
72 Id. at 99. 
73 Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
74 Id. at 605. 
75 Id. at 614. 
76 Id. at 634–35. 
77 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520–21 (1978). 
78 Id. at 522. 
79 Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987). 
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Court said in NAACP v. Button80 that “[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of free 
expression are suspect. . . . Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an 
area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.”81 
The function of the overbreadth doctrine “attenuates as the otherwise 
unprotected behavior that forbids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’ 
towards conduct and that conduct—even if expressive—falls within the scope of 
otherwise criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining 
comprehensive controls over harmful constitutionally unprotected conduct.”82 
Moreover, when a law is shown to punish a significant portion of protected 
expression compared to the statute’s legitimate sweep, all enforcement of the law is 
invalidated unless the courts have narrowed its application.83 Finally, as a plaintiff 
needs only to show “the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or 
‘chill’ [protected expression]”84 to challenge a law based on a claim of overbreadth; 
the traditional requirements for standing do not need to be met.85 
B. Justiciability of Intelligence Gathering 
Laird v. Tatum86 is the leading Supreme Court case discussing political 
intelligence gathering. The suit was brought for declaratory judgment that Army’s 
surveillance of ‘lawful and peaceful civilian political activity’ was unconstitutional 
and requested an injunction forbidding such surveillance.87 However, the Court 
held that the plaintiffs failed to present a justiciable controversy by alleging that the 
mere existence and operation of the Army’s intelligence-gathering and distributing 
system constituted a ‘chilling’ effect on their First Amendment rights.88 The Court 
noted that the plaintiffs identified no specific evidence of unlawful surveillance 
activities against them but indicated that the government’s principal sources of 
information were news media and publications in general circulation.89 
                                                          
80 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). 
81 Id. 
82 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 614 (1973). 
83 See Faustin v. City & Cnty. of Denver, Colo., 423 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2005). 
84 Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003). 
85 Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612. 
86 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
87 Id. at 2. 
88 Id. at 9. 
89 Id. at 6. 
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However, Laird, while appearing to be “on-point,” is in-fact factually 
dissimilar to the issues presented in this article. In that case, the Army deployed a 
large number of forces to read material that was substantially public in nature.90 In 
fact, most of the reviewed material was acquired from newspaper articles.91 With 
mobile devices, the acquisition and analysis of data is both automatic, requiring no 
human assets, and has not been publically published. 
Given that the Supreme Court has not spoken beyond Laird, issues of 
standing will continue to present significant obstacles in cases alleging injury from 
surveillance. First, plaintiffs will need to show actual chilling effects due to 
surveillance.92 Second, plaintiffs will be required to show a direct objective link 
between the chill and the governmental actions, and not their subjective state of 
mind.93 
In Smith v. Maryland,94 the Supreme Court held that people had “no 
legitimate expectation of privacy” in the telephone numbers they dialed because 
they voluntarily conveyed such information to the telephone companies.95 In Jones, 
Justice Sotomayor expressed concern with this interpretation: “this approach is ill 
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”96 Indeed, 
third parties collect mobile device location data regularly while the device is in 
operation, and sometimes, even beyond the times when the user is actively using 
the mobile device.97 
C. Balancing National Security and the First Amendment 
The nexus of the government’s interest in strong national security and their 
duty to preserve, protect, and defend the freedoms guaranteed by the First 
Amendment creates a web of difficult policy choices. Preservation of the security 
of the United States from its enemies, foreign and domestic, is a critical obligation 
of the government; in fact, it is one of the foremost reasons governments exist. At 
                                                          
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 See Matthew Lynch, Closing the Orwellian Loophole: The Present Constitutionally of Big 
Brother and the Potential for a First Amendment Cure, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 234, 269 (2007). 
93 Id. 
94 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
95 Id. at 744. 
96 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
97 See supra Part I.B and associated footnotes. 
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times, the pursuit of this important goal leads governmental agents to trespass in 
areas protected by the guarantees of expression. 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)98 is perhaps the most 
visible tool used by government agents to acquire and analyze data outside of the 
typical channels of judicial review. Obtaining business records is expressly 
provided for under FISA.99 These records are often obtained through the use of 
National Security Letters (NSLs) authorized by the USA Patriot Act.100 The NSLs 
may be issued without oversight from courts, and they effectively function as 
administrative subpoenas that place an additional gag order on the recipient from 
disclosing even the existence of the demand.101 Their use by law enforcement is 
widespread,102 however, a recent court ruling103 found the NSLs to be 
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds, noting that the enabling legislation 
is “impermissibly overbroad and not narrowly tailored.”104 
III. THE NEXUS BETWEEN SURVEILLANCE AND EXPRESSIVE 
ASSOCIATION 
Broad and sweeping surveillance programs105 can infringe upon the freedom 
of association. Compared to the relatively brief intrusions that occurred in past 
cases,106 the intrusion inflicted by prolonged electronic monitoring of mobile 
device location data is far more revealing. Additionally, the ultimate intrusion 
exacted by prolonged monitoring is greater than any other invasive police practice 
deemed to be a “search” by the Supreme Court. Because GPS monitoring is 
                                                          
98 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885 (2006). 
99 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006). 
100 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006) (NSL enablement within the Stored Communications Act); Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
101 My National Security Letter Gag Order, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2007), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/22/AR2007032201882.html. 
102 Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Google Releases First Data on National Security Letters, 
MASHABLE (Mar. 5, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/03/05/google-releases-data-on-nsls/; GOOGLE, 
supra note 38. 
103 In re Nat’l Sec. Letter, 2013 WL 1095417 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2013). See also Doe v. 
Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding the nondisclosure provisions of an NSL themselves to 
be a First Amendment violation). 
104 In re Nat’l Sec. Letter, 2013 WL 1095417. 
105 See supra Part II.A.2 and associated footnotes. 
106 See, e.g., supra Part II.B and associated footnotes. 
  
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XIII – Spring 2013 ● ISSN 1087-6995 (print) 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2013.121 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
relatively cheap compared to “conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, 
proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law 
enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’”107 
Thus, “[a]wareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and 
expressive freedoms” and “may ‘alter the relationship between citizen and 
government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.’”108 
Moreover, “[i]n the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were 
neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical.”109 Furthermore, it was noted that 
if traditional methods had been used to achieve a similar result to the prolonged 
GPS monitoring in Jones, then large quantities of personnel, vehicles, time, and 
expenses would have been required. The best solution to circumstances involving 
significant developments in technology may be found through legislative action, as 
articulated by Justice Alito.110 
IV. CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations discussed in this section are tailored to the challenges 
faced by the Federal Government; however, many of the same values can be 
directly translated to state and local levels of government. 
A. Legislative Actions 
Congress has the ability to amend existing laws to clarify when a 
governmental agent has the authority to obtain mobile device location data without 
prior judicial authorization.111 Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, 
Congress has the authority to legislate on the topic directly, and specifically, 
Congress can limit the acquisition and analysis of mobile device location data. 
                                                          
107 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Illinois 
v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 429 (2004)). 
108 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 
2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)). For an argument that the use of GPS technology may also violate the 
First Amendment’s right to association, see Courtney Burten, Unwarranted! Privacy in a Technological 
Age: The Fourth Amendment Difficulty in Protecting Against Warrantless GPS Tracking and the 
Substantive Due Process and First Amendment Boost, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 359, 383 (2012). 
109 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring). 
110 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
111 See generally Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret 
Docket, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 313 (2012) (advocating the elimination of automatic gagging and 
sealing of surveillance orders). 
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Certain efforts have been initiated.112 These efforts should be embraced and 
enacted. 
Congress should also create positions within executive agencies that routinely 
review the actions within their respective agencies to assure that the government 
agents are acting within their mandate so that the government can prevent the 
collection and analysis of mobile device location data of innocent people in this 
country.113 
B. Executive Actions 
The President of the United States, the Cabinet Secretaries, and the Agency 
Directors have broad discretion in deciding the policies, procedures, and methods 
used by their agents to gather mobile device location data. Here are a few examples 
of actions that can be reasonably taken by the Executive Branch.  
The Department of Justice can direct the various law enforcement agencies 
within the department to limit their intake of mobile device location data to specific 
investigations with narrowly tailored objectives. It can end the “cell records data 
dumps” currently used that seek wide portions of location records, often sweeping 
in the data of innocent individuals otherwise free of suspicion.114 
The FCC can announce guidelines115 for mobile device network operators 
regarding the length of time records that should be kept, and advocate the deletion 
of records that no longer support the growth of cellular networks. 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has significant authority over the 
business conduct of both the telecommunications industry, as well as the third party 
application authors. The FTC should articulate the harms faced by the unauthorized 
use of mobile device location data, and develop transparent guidelines for the 
collection and storage of mobile device location data, including providing that data 
to the users who created it.116 
                                                          
112 See, e.g., Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, H.R. 2168, 112th Cong. (2011); 
reintroduced as H.R. 1312, 113th Cong. (2013). 
113 Balkin, supra note 5, at 207. 
114 See ED MARKEY, supra note 40. 
115 These guidelines do not need to be mandatory regulations. 
116 See, e.g., Megha Rajagopalan, Cellphone Companies Will Share Your Location Data—Just 
Not With You, PRO PUBLICA (June 26, 2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/cellphone-companies-
will-share-your-location-data-just-not-with-you (noting that while telecommunications companies 
collect locational data, their users are often unable to see the scope of the data collection, or have access 
to the records). 
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C. Judicial Remedies 
In the near terms, the courts will have little ability to directly confront the 
issue of the collection and use of mobile device location data by government 
agents. In addition to waiting until a case in controversy presents itself, when a case 
is actually posed to the court, the plaintiff will have to prove they have the standing 
to bring such a claim. This has proven difficult in past cases. 
Traditional constitutional protections under the Fourth Amendment may be 
inadequate. Indeed, in the cases of the targets of foreign intelligence surveillance, 
Congress has limited the application of the Fourth Amendment through FISA.117 
In cases similar to Smith v. Maryland, where courts are faced with records 
obtained from third parties, they should take a skeptical stance instead of blindly 
applying the Supreme Court’s precedent.118 Cases that involve significant 
collections of electronic data should be viewed as factually dissimilar to Smith, and 
thus subject to a different standard that requires direct judicial oversight. 
CONCLUSION 
Government agencies should be permitted to acquire and analyze mobile 
device location data for legitimate, limited investigations of criminal activity. 
Those activities should operate within a Fourth Amendment search regime, where a 
narrowly tailored warrant is granted by an independent, disinterested magistrate. 
All government programs that acquire and analyze mobile device location data 
which are not subject to a warrant requirement should face strict scrutiny review, 
where the government must show that the program supports a vital government 
interest and that the means chosen to further the compelling interest are the least 
restrictive to the freedoms of expression and association. 
                                                          
117 Balkin, supra note 5, at 205. 
118 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
